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INTRODUCTION
Personal insolvency law became more significant after the Great Recession of 2008 when international institutions identified household debt as a potential systemic risk for the international financial system. 1 The subsequent Eurozone crisis accelerated insolvency law reforms within the European Union ('EU'), which proposed a directive on insolvency and restructuring law in 2016. 2 Emerging economies have also introduced or reformed personal more careful screening of those wishing to file for insolvency, or better social and economic policies to address directly the problems associated with insolvency such as job insecurity or limited health coverage. 11 Bankruptcy research functions in this last case as the 'canary in the mine', identifying wider problems in society.
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The gap identified between the promise and reality of the 'fresh start' leads to my final topic, reflection on the role of personal insolvency in contemporary capitalism. A conventional view is that the fresh start in bankruptcy is a modestly progressive safety net for addressing overindebtedness. Certainly, this assumption underlies the emerging paradigm and much contemporary research on personal insolvency law. Since the Great Recession, theoretical writing on the role of credit and debt in capitalism has mushroomed. 13 A few writers 14 have reconceptualised bankruptcy as a disciplinary and legitimating device in a contemporary capitalism defined by debt. Bankruptcy law mediates the contradictions between the imperatives of a contemporary capitalism defined by credit-led accumulation and the inevitable problems of non-repayment for certain groups in society. 15 This perspective challenges the progressive assumptions about insolvency law, and I examine briefly the significance of this perspective for future research on personal insolvency.
II AN EMERGING INTERNATIONAL PARADIGM?
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A policy paradigm represents a framework of ideas on the goals of a policy, the instruments that can be used to attain the goals and the nature of the problem at issue. 17 In the area of corporate insolvency law, 18 an international paradigm 19 has emerged since the Asian financial crisis of the late 1990s, when a modified Anglo-American 'rescue culture' was internationalised as part of the international financial architecture of economic development. This order is embedded in the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law ('UNCITRAL') legislative guide on insolvency, providing best practices for assessing a state's insolvency law, and functioning as part of structural adjustment programmes under loan conditionality. In contrast, personal insolvency was viewed historically as not significant internationally in terms of the international financial architecture. Along with the topic of overindebtedness it raised social, cultural and political issues which were best left to individual states. 20 Until the 1990s, many industrialised nations had no -or limited -personal insolvency systems which provided a discharge of debts. Where discharge was available it was usually limited to traders. 21 However, developments in Europe and elsewhere since the recession of the early 1990s and the subsequent Great Recession of 2008 suggest the contours of an emerging paradigm of personal insolvency.
A policy paradigm assumes agreement on the nature of the problem at issue. The immediate problem addressed by personal insolvency is that of over-indebtedness, but disagreement has existed as to whether factors such as unemployment or individual behaviour through overspending are the primary causes of over-indebtedness. 22 The EU Commission identifies over-indebtedness mostly with unemployment, divorce and illness, 23 while a recent Bank of France study indicates a 'conjuncture of events' as the primary reason (see Table 1 ). The Insolvency Service in England and Wales identifies both exogenous and individual causes for insolvency (Table 2 ). These official statistics on reasons for bankruptcy are important politically because they suggest the nature of a policy response, contribute to ongoing political debates, and shape dominant narratives about the nature of failure. However, the limits of the categorisations in these data and their partial construction of the social reality of overindebtedness mean that they should be treated with caution. 22 Resulting in significant differences between systems for example in relation to access criteria, institutional frameworks, time to discharge and discharge exceptions. 23 European Commission, above n 2, 4. 24 I discuss the limits of statistics on reasons for bankruptcy and the various research studies on causes of personal insolvency further in Ramsay, above n 16, 16-24. Source: Insolvency Service, Bankruptcies by age gender and cause of insolvency 2015. https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/individual-insolvencies-by-location-age-and-genderengland-and-wales-2015>. In 955 cases, the cause was recorded as 'unknown/non-surrender'. These cases are not included in the Table. After the Great Recession, writers linked individual debt problems to macroeconomic issues. 25 The policy problem now was that significant numbers of over-indebted individuals created a debt overhang and acted as a drag on economic growth. One response was therefore the provision of access to a swift deleveraging of debt. This swift deleveraging narrative was, as I will argue in the next section, initially adopted by the International Monetary Fund ('IMF'), but ran into headwinds in its application within the EU. This debate over the nature of the problem of individual failure to repay suggests that laws will continue attempting to balance debt relief with provisions intended to address moral hazard and individual behaviour.
The goals of individual insolvency policy are encapsulated in the idea of the fresh start but the concept of the fresh start is ambiguous, even in a country sometimes regarded as its source, the US. A fresh start may simply mean being free from the burden of existing debt, but might also include ideas of financial and social reintegration. 26 Promoting entrepreneurialism through a swift fresh start has become an influential idea. Several European states, such as Germany and the Netherlands, promoted social reintegration through the use of independent debt counselling agencies as the primary intermediaries. Individual counselling provided a substitute for rollbacks in welfare provision. 27 Although counselling could be justified in terms of an enabling welfare state which would help individuals to participate again in the labour market rather than receive cash transfers, the limited funding for counselling and patchy national 25 See Atif Mian and Amir Sufi, House of Debt: How They (and You) Caused the Great Recession, and How We Can Prevent it from Happening Again (University of Chicago Press, 2015). 26 See eg discussion in Margaret Howard, 'A Theory of Discharge in Consumer Bankruptcy ' (1987) coverage, as in Sweden, undercut its potential effectiveness. 28 In contrast, the US and Canada now mandate financial counselling for bankrupts, based partly on a perception that individual financial mismanagement leads to insolvency, as well as the political influence of financial institutions. The EU Directive highlights the economic benefits for investment, lending and promoting consumer demand through a swift discharge. 29 It focuses on the economic rather than social benefits of the fresh start.
Repayment plans with residual immediate relief for the deserving poor represent the preferred instruments for achieving the fresh start while addressing concerns about moral hazard. This represents the most solid aspect of the paradigm. We noted this trend in 2009. 30 It is certainly the continental European model. The development of debt adjustment systems in Europe, often introduced by conservative governments in the 1990s represented an adjustment to a more neoliberal model of the role of the market and social provision. 31 European studies and soft law initiatives during this period outlined an optimal policy for personal insolvency, partly inspired by Chapter 13 of the US Bankruptcy Code. 32 It included the idea of a moratorium or stay, a realistic payment plan, usually no more than four years subject to majority approval by creditors, adequate exemptions determined by member states, professional debt counsellors acting as advisers and administrators, financing partly by creditor levies, with immediate discharge for the hopelessly indebted. By 2009, Jason Kilborn argued that European policymakers were converging on a 'unitary paradigm of consumer insolvency treatment' involving less demanding repayment plans and greater possibilities for the residual discharge of debts. 33 These developments reflect partly a social learning process concerning the fact that many individuals had little payment capacity, and partly state concerns about the public costs of processing debtors. For example, the introduction of the English NINA procedure was driven by a desire to minimise court and government processing costs.
A significant ambiguity in the scope of the paradigm concerns its application to both individual consumers and traders, and whether traders should have a swifter period of discharge than consumers. The promotion of entrepreneurialism through a liberal discharge procedure is an 28 This was the conclusion of the Hedborg Report in 2013 in Sweden SOU 2013 Out of the Debt Trap. I discuss this at greater length in Ramsay above n 16, ch 5.
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'Shorter discharge periods have a positive impact on both consumers and investors, as they are quicker to reenter the cycles of consumption and investment. This boosts entrepreneurship': European Commission, above n 2, 4. The social aspects of insolvency have less salience in the Directive. The EU Economic and Social Committee had recommended for consumers in 2014 'a free procedure, a moratorium on claims, ability to keep main residence and the possibility of cancelling debts in most extreme situation. The goal is to find a solution that will enable households to avoid social exclusion and where possible to pay off their debts as far as their means allow': see 'Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on Consumer Protection and Appropriate Treatment of Over-indebtedness to Prevent Social Exclusion' (Exploratory Opinion) INT/726 Rapporteur-general Reine Claude Mader (2014). 30 See Niemi, Ramsay and Whitford, above n 10, 7: 'Today most countries sponsor repayment plans, with or without a discharge option upon conclusion, and even common law countries that traditionally have emphasized nearly unconditional access to a discharge procedure increasingly emphasize repayment plans as an alternative.' integral aspect of the emerging international paradigm. The EU Directive of 2016 proposes a maximum three-year discharge period for the honest entrepreneur as part of wider policies to enhance entrepreneurialism in the EU, with the possibility of applying this period to consumers. 34 In Britain, the new Labour government at the beginning of the century embraced entrepreneurialism in the 2002 liberalisation of the English discharge procedure. 35 The shortening of the discharge period in Germany from six to three years in 2014 for individuals able to pay a portion of their debts is also intended to promote entrepreneurialism.
36 Some European countries have recently introduced special provisions to make it easier for entrepreneurs to fail (Sweden, France, Spain). Australia recommends liberalisation of the discharge process to promote entrepreneurialism. 37 Consumers, the self-employed and small businesses represent overlapping categories of debtors. Many self-employed individuals use personal credit cards to finance their business and mortgage the family home to support a business. In the 'gig economy', with workers no longer employed in traditional 9-5 jobs, 38 the self-employed are little different from employees. Moreover, consumers are, like businesses, encouraged to be responsible risk takers, investing in education or training, and managing their financial future in an increasingly financialised culture.
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The concept of the individual as an 'entrepreneur of the self' managing one's human capital erodes distinctions between the entrepreneur and the consumer. International institutions have contributed to the development of the contemporary paradigm since the Great Recession. The IMF promoted in some documents the importance of a swift deleveraging of household debt in the wake of the crisis, arguing that such measures would benefit primarily those with a higher propensity to consume (average to lower income consumers) and thus drive a recovery.
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However this 'swift deleveraging' approach received more muted support in the actual work of the IMF in Europe after the Eurozone crisis, suggesting political resistance by states and other actors such as the European Central Bank. An IMF working paper in 2013 argued from cross-country experience that reforms should 34 European Commission, above n 2, art 20; and see Recital 15 where the Commission notes that consumer overindebtedness is a matter of 'great economic and social concern'. 35 The Insolvency Service Annual Report 2014-2015 states at the outset that 'Entrepreneurialism and a drive for business growth will be accompanied by financial failures as well as successes'.
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Frank Fossen quotes the German Minister of Justice stating that the 'reform of insolvency law is one of the most important projects in business law' and that 'those who exhibit the entrepreneurial spirit deserve legal protection that encourages them in their decision to depart into self-employment': Frank M Fossen, 'Personal Bankruptcy Law, Wealth, and Entrepreneurship -Evidence from the Introduction of a "Fresh Start" Policy' provide a fresh start for 'financially responsible' individuals, typically after three to five years. It also proposed a swift 'no income no asset procedure' for those with no repayment capacity. 42 This latter procedure recognises the limits of existing European repayment systems where significant numbers of individuals have no repayment capacity and may be unable to pay for accessing the insolvency system in those countries which impose a fee. 43 The idea of a special NINA procedure originated in New Zealand and was implemented in England and Wales in 2009. Writers appeal to this idea as a model for US bankruptcy simplification. 44 The English model is a means-tested administrative procedure involving an online application to the Insolvency Service through a limited number of primarily publicly subsidised 45 'approved intermediaries', 46 who act as screening agencies checking the eligibility of the debtor. 47 The order can be used every six years. A debtor must inform the Insolvency Service of any change in her or his financial status (for example, increase in income) during the one-year period. 48 The use of the term 'Debt Relief' rather than bankruptcy is intended to avoid the stigma of bankruptcy, which might deter some applicants. 49 The objectives of the procedure are to 
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Citizens Advice, a registered charity, is the major intermediary. Citizens Advice aims 'to provide the advice people need for the problems they face' and improve the policies and principles that affect people's lives', a research and campaigns agenda known as 'social policy', <https://www.citizensadvice.org.uk/about-us/>. It receives the majority of its funding from central government and each local bureau may also receive funds from institutions such as the National Lottery. A central office provides expertise, but it relies heavily on volunteers in local bureaux. Its website indicates that there are '338 individual charities… Of the 28 500 people who work for the service, over 22,000 of them are volunteers and nearly 6,500 are paid staff'. 46 See Debt Relief Orders (Designation of Competent Authorities) Regulations 2009, reg 3(2)(b)(i). 47 Access is limited to individuals with non-exempt assets below £1000, a vehicle valued at less than £1000, unsecured debts less than £20 000, and no more than £50 in surplus income, based on a formula tracking reasonable expenditures of individuals in the bottom income quintile. Data indicate that about 1 per cent of applications are rejected by the Insolvency Service with further information requested in about 5 per cent of cases. Individuals must pay for the service (£90) with £10 going to the approved intermediary. Access is barred to individuals who have entered into a transaction at an undervalue or given a preference within the previous two years, and debtor behaviour can be sanctioned through a DRO restriction order. A restriction order may be made either through the court, or an undertaking by the debtor to the Insolvency Service. A broad discretion exists to make such an order where it is appropriately structured by a list of factors such as 'incurring, before the date of the determination of the application for the [DRO], a debt which the debtor had no reasonable expectation of being able to pay': see Insolvency Act 1986, sch 4ZB(2)(h). 48 Insolvency Act 1986, s 251J(5). 49 This description was proposed in a 2004 research paper on administration orders where the authors noted that 'some of the people we interviewed were very resistant to the idea of bankruptcy, and were deterred by the stigma provide debt relief for those who are unable to pay the costs of accessing bankruptcy (approximately £700) and to prevent financial exclusion.
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In 2013, the World Bank, after recognising the international significance of consumer insolvency in 2011, 51 published a Report on the Treatment of the Insolvency of Natural Persons. 52 This document did not outline best practices, 53 but recognised the dominance internationally of payment plans as a condition of relief. 54 It was implicitly critical of long repayment plans imposed on individuals with no repayment capacity as in Germany (six years) and Sweden (five years). Although individuals may be given a 'zero repayment plan' in these jurisdictions, they are not discharged until the end of the plan. The World Bank report, like the IMF, also highlighted the problem of the NINA debtor, the individual with no assets or repayment capacity or resources to pay for insolvency. German studies suggest that 80 per cent of debtors on plans are nullinsolvenz, that is, they have no capacity to make repayments over the six-year waiting period. 55 In Sweden, approximately 40 per cent of debtors on the five-year restructuring plans have no repayment capacity.
56 Figure 1 shows the rise in France of rétablissement personnel, providing an immediate discharge to individuals with no likelihood of repaying their debts. The World Bank Report also recognised the issue of moral hazard in a bankruptcy system, but concluded that there was a danger that focus on this issue could they would face given the relatively small sums of money they owed … A simplified debt procedure would therefore seem more appropriate for people on very low incomes that are unlikely to increase. This could be called something other than bankruptcy, to overcome the stigma that people feel, and differentiate it from the full bankruptcy procedure. 2013). This was the work of a small group of academics, (the author was a member of the drafting committee, chaired by Jason Kilborn), within the context of a World Bank Task Force comprised of lawyers, government representatives, academics, judges (primarily US bankruptcy judges), and representatives of UNCITRAL. 53 The reasons were the potential diversity of cultural, and social issues associated with personal insolvency. World Bank above n 52, [12] . While these reasons have some weight, the approach taken by the Report was also driven by political factors. The Bank wished to publish a report quickly, and any attempt to state best practices might result in the project being taken over by UNCITRAL. See discussion in Ramsay, above n 16, ch 6. overshadow the many benefits of debt relief, and existing evidence did not suggest moral hazard was a significant problem. It might be argued that Anglo-Saxon systems do not fit the paradigm of a preference for repayment plans, given the historic role of straight bankruptcy providing a bankruptcy discharge without the necessity of an income repayment order. Moreover, individuals in Anglo systems may choose their insolvency solution, whereas states such as Germany impose a standard solution on debtors. These differences might suggest the persistence of legal origins in creating difference. 58 However, common law systems have witnessed the rise of formal repayment alternatives, for example the Individual Voluntary Arrangement ('IVA') in England and Wales (Figure 2 ) promoted by entrepreneurial debt intermediaries, the consumer proposal in Canada (see Figure 3) , 59 or the debt settlement arrangement in Australia (Figure 4 ). The UK, Canada and Australia have also introduced 'surplus income' requirements so that individuals may be making payments for up to three years after they are discharged. Even in the US, the non-dischargeability of significant debts such as student loans and the use of reaffirmation agreements mean that individuals may continue to repay debts notwithstanding the discharge. 60 US legislators have historically demonstrated a preference for Chapter 13, the partial repayment alternative, as the primary remedy for consumer debtors at least since the Bankruptcy Reform Act 1978, even if in practice this preference was frustrated by debtor choice and the reality of debtors' circumstances. 61 In the UK, government as well as insolvency professionals share a master narrative of 'can pay should pay'. The major professional body, R3, is lobbying for an extension of the standard bankruptcy discharge period to three years, with a swift discharge reserved for the deserving poor under the Debt Relief Order ('DRO'). This emerging paradigm of the primacy of repayment plans assumes that such an approach is economically and socially beneficial and in Part III, below, I examine existing empirical studies on the effectiveness of existing personal insolvency systems in achieving a fresh start. As a preliminary, one characteristic is the increasing length of plans in common law jurisdictions. Thirty years ago, conventional wisdom was that a plan in excess of three years would often fail, 64 but plans are now written for five years or more as in the case of the IVA. 65 It is not clear whether this is economically or socially beneficial. 66 Completion rates of repayment plans raise concerns, 67 and the absence of any repayments by many debtors on plans in countries such as Sweden and Germany suggest the need for a swift discharge for many debtors. Constructing the NINA process as a residual programme does not seem to fit the reality of these systems where substantial numbers of debtors seem to have no repayment capacity. Braucher, surveying studies of repayment alternatives in North America, Australia and Europe in 2009 concluded that existing data, while 'spotty' suggested that these alternatives had high costs in relation to debt repayment and 'significant rates of failure to achieve a discharge'.
68 Almost no knowledge existed on whether repayment plans were effective treatments for over-indebtedness or simply left 'many debtors struggling financially and perhaps in other ways too'.
69 In many countries this question remains unanswered.
III CONTEMPORARY EMPIRICAL RESEARCH ON THE 'FRESH START'
The 'fresh start' is a central objective of personal insolvency law in many countries. The absence of significant assets in most individual bankruptcies undercuts the significance of the traditional bankruptcy objective of equitable distribution of assets among creditors. The World Bank outlines several objectives associated with the fresh start: encouraging entrepreneurialism; increased productivity; promoting financial and social inclusion; reducing health and welfare costs; encouraging responsible lending; and maximising economic activity.
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The EU Commission identifies 'reduced consumption, labour activity and foregone growth opportunities' with over-indebtedness, arguing that shorter discharge periods will case, a debt adviser failed to correct a debtor's misconception about the effects of bankruptcy and recommended a debt management plan lasting 125 years! Firms often had incentive structures for selling debt solutions. 64 The Cork Committee concluded in 1982 that the maximum duration of the proposed Debts Arrangement Order should be three years since 'it is clear from the Judicial statistics relating to administration orders that debtors are unlikely to maintain the discipline of instalment payments over periods in excess of three years and we therefore recommend this period as the norm': Insolvency Law Review Committee (UK), (Cork Committee), Insolvency Law and Practice: Report, Cmnd 8558 (1982) [313] . 65 See Jean Braucher, 'A Law-in-Action Approach to Comparative Study of Repayment Forms of Consumer Bankruptcy' in Niemi, Ramsay and Whitford, above n 10, 333. Braucher suggested three criteria for evaluating repayment systems: creditor repayment, debt relief, and treatment of debt problems. 67 Insolvency Service data in England and Wales indicate a failure rate of 30-40 per cent for IVAs: Insolvency Service, above n 65. Studies in the US have pointed to high failure rates for Chapter 13 plans. The study by Mikhed and Scholnick, above n 65, indicates a failure rate of 23 per cent in Canada. 68 Braucher, above n 66, 353. 69 Ibid. 70 Other benefits include proper account valuation, reducing wasteful collection costs, concentrating losses on more efficient and effective loss distributors. See World Bank, above n 52, [400] for summary. permit consumers to re-enter the 'cycle of consumption'.
71 Given these objectives, the task of research must be to determine whether existing systems achieve them. At the outset, it must be stated that this is a challenging research question. Bankrupts are a difficult group to study, and longitudinal data requires following individuals over a reasonable period of time. Moreover, in order to draw firm conclusions about the effect of personal insolvency law, one should ideally have a control group of similarly situated individuals who have not experienced insolvency.
The US tradition of the liberal 'fresh start' is an obvious site for testing the effectiveness of the fresh start. Several US studies question the efficacy of the existing fresh start under both Chapter 7 and Chapter 13. Porter and Thorne found that one year after bankruptcy filing, 25 per cent of Chapter 7 bankrupts were struggling to pay routine bills and 33 per cent had a similar financial situation to that when they filed bankruptcy. 72 They noted that the Brookings Institution had reached a similar conclusion in their study of bankrupts in the mid-1960s. A key factor differentiating those in continuing financial difficulties from other bankrupts was the absence of an adequate and steady income. 73 A bankruptcy discharge did not solve this problem, because employers might not hire an individual who had filed for bankruptcy notwithstanding the prohibition in bankruptcy law on discrimination against bankrupts. Thus, although bankruptcy seemed to provide a fresh start for the majority of bankrupts, Porter and Thorne concluded that for others it was a 'temporary refuge' from continuing income problems. 74 Other studies suggest that bankrupts may continue to suffer financially for a substantial period after bankruptcy. Zagorsky and Lupicka concluded on the basis of a comparative study of filers and non-filers that for filers it 'took many years to restore financial well-being'.
75 Han and Li concluded that bankrupts have less access to unsecured credit such as credit cards after bankruptcy and were more likely than other consumers to use expensive credit sources. Although this high cost did reduce over time, filers were still more prone to face financial hardship ten years after filing. 76 They concluded that 'for many bankrupt households, debt discharge alone failed to provide a long-run improvement in their financial health'.
77 More recent research suggests that the seven and 10-year bankruptcy 'flags' on a credit file had a 71 European Commission, above n 2, 4. ' We found that just one year post bankruptcy, one in four debtors was struggling to pay routine bills, and one in three debtors reported an overall financial situation similar to, or worse than, when that debtor filed bankruptcy. Our analysis of these data demonstrates that steady and sufficient income is the key to improved post-bankruptcy financial health. Factors that cause household income to decline, such as unemployment and underemployment, illness or injury, and old age, undermine the chances of financial recovery. These data reveal the limitations of bankruptcy as a social safety net and highlight the fragile economic situations of American families. We conclude that bankruptcy is an incomplete tool to rehabilitate those in financial distress.' substantial impact on credit availability, with increases in credit scores and credit balances after the flags were lifted. 78 It is often assumed that debtors do not obtain credit after bankruptcy because of the limits of available credit supply. Porter questions this conventional wisdom, citing studies which demonstrate that a significant credit market exists, targeting recently discharged bankrupts. She concludes that many debtors who have experienced bankruptcy do not borrow on credit cards because of the painful experience of bankruptcy. 79 This undermines the fresh start objective of facilitating re-entry to the credit market.
Empirical studies of Chapter 13, which permits an individual to cure arrears on a home mortgage and repay a portion of debts over three to five years have questioned its benefits. Studies document low completion rates (on average about one third of filers obtain a discharge) and a failure by many individuals to save their homes, which is often a reason for filing for Chapter 13. 80 One recent study, using a logistic regression analysis of national data from the 2007 Consumer Bankruptcy project, concludes that the majority of individuals do not complete plans under Chapter 13, that Chapter 13 does not act as a home-saving device, and generally delays rather than prevents foreclosure. Chapter 13, the authors conclude is 'profoundly inefficient'.
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These socio-legal studies contrast with an econometric study by Dobbie and Song, 82 which followed the trajectory of individuals in Chapter 13 from 1992 to 2005 in terms of subsequent earnings, mortality rates, and home foreclosure. Using a randomised methodology, 83 which allowed for the existence of a control group, the authors found that over the first five post-filing years those at the margin who were granted Chapter 13 bankruptcy protection were significantly better off financially in terms of income, 84 and had a significantly lower mortality rate and home foreclosure rate than those denied bankruptcy protection. The difference between the groups is represented by the significant deterioration in those who did not obtain bankruptcy protection rather than gains by those granted protection. Those who filed successfully for Chapter 13 have similar pre-and post-filing earnings. Therefore, bankruptcy Will Dobbie and Jae Song, 'Debt Relief and Debtor Outcomes: Measuring the Effects of Consumer Bankruptcy Protection' (2015) 105 American Economic Review 1272. 83 Bankruptcy filers are randomly assigned to judges who vary in their rates of granting bankruptcy protection. They were therefore able to investigate individuals at the margin who might randomly be confirmed or rejected. After discarding data relating to bankruptcy offices with a single judge and certain other factors which prevented random assignment, the authors' data represented 26 per cent of Ch 13 filings during this period. 84 Marginal recipient of Ch 13 earning $5 562 more than marginal dismissed filer. appeared to mitigate the effects of a financial downturn for an individual preceding bankruptcy. 85 The study also suggests that bankruptcy protection might increase incentives to continue to work, through its protection against wage garnishment.
86 Economic stability might be promoted, 87 because individuals do not have incentives to go underground, or move state to avoid wage garnishment, and are protected against immediate home foreclosure. The authors conclude that Chapter 13 bankruptcy protection provides significant benefits for debtors.
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The contrast between the findings of this study and previous socio-legal studies is striking. Thus, although many individuals do not receive a discharge in Chapter 13, according to Dobbie and Song they have a better post-bankruptcy experience than those not granted protection. These US findings on Chapter 13 and Chapter 7 suggest that some debtors do benefit from these chapters, but for at least a minority of debtors the costs of bankruptcy may be high and it may not be addressing continuing problems of inadequate or insecure income. 89 Sullivan, Warren and Westbrook also suggest that the stigma of bankruptcy may have increased over time as greater media publicity is given to filings and the importance of maintaining a good credit score. A potential bankrupt may now fear the cost to her or his credit reputation, in a similar manner to the historical fear of disapproval by one's neighbours and community. 90 European studies of the longitudinal effects of personal insolvency relief are limited. No recent systematic studies exist in England and Wales, a jurisdiction which liberalised the bankruptcy discharge in 2002 by reducing the period from three years to one year. The English Insolvency Service evaluated the impact of this reform, concluding in 2007 that although a swift discharge did have immediate emotional benefits, bankrupts still faced difficulties in re-entering the financial market because there were no changes in lending and credit reference policies. 91 The concept of stigma was associated by bankrupts with problems obtaining a bank account, being unable to repay creditors, and the effects on their credit rating.
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The few empirical studies of continental European repayment plans are troubling. A qualitative longitudinal analysis of individuals on debt restructuring plans in Finland indicates that individuals continued to live at a low subsistence level one year after the payment plan had ended. 93 A pilot study of individuals who had used the Swedish debt restructuring system 85 '[B]ankruptcy protection mitigates the long-term consequences of financial shocks that might otherwise harm debtors but does not confer any benefits in the absence of a financial shock': Dobbie and Song, above n 81, 1292. 86 The authors tested this by analysing the effects in states with different wage garnishment laws. 87 Tested through analysis of probability of individual working in the same industry, and on probability of worker in baseline county. 88 Dobbie and Song, above n 82, 1274. 89 Hacker, above n 11. 95 although a majority responded that debt relief had provided a solution to their financial problems. Finally, recent Australian research questions whether bankruptcy provides significant benefits for disadvantaged and low income, individuals since it fails to address the structural causes of financial hardship. Ali, O'Brien and Ramsay conclude that, while bankruptcy provides many benefits, they are unevenly distributed with 'access to adequate income' playing a critical role in rehabilitation. 96 The promotion of entrepreneurialism is part of the personal insolvency paradigm but studying the effects of bankruptcy law on entrepreneurialism throws up the difficulty of identifying 'entrepreneurs'. Entrepreneurialism is associated with innovation but studies often use selfemployment as a proxy. Self-employment is a category which may be over-inclusive as a proxy for innovation, ranging from individuals who are 'very self-sufficient to extremely vulnerable'.
97 It may include individuals who were formerly employed and are in precarious positions with low incomes and few social protections. A widely cited econometric study does indicate a correlation over time between the liberality of the bankruptcy discharge, and levels of self-employment. 98 However, the study does not comment on the quality or innovative nature of the self-employment which is encouraged. Another study suggests no connection between insolvency and innovative entrepreneurship. 99 The English Insolvency Service found no connection between the liberalised discharge procedures in 2002 and business start-ups (used as a proxy for entrepreneurialism).
100 Moreover, while a more forgiving bankruptcy law may permit more marginal high-risk business activity it may also result in higher credit costs for all entrepreneurs, 101 in terms of interest rates and collateral requirements. In the US, more homeowners in states with high homestead exemptions are likely to own a business, but may pay higher interest rates for credit.
US bankruptcy law is the inspiration for European policy makers wishing to promote entrepreneurialism through bankruptcy. 'Fail fast, fail cheap and move on' is a mantra 94 The Swedish restructuring system requires a five-year period of rehabilitation irrespective of ability to make any payment. 95 associated with Silicon Valley but socio-legal study of bankrupt entrepreneurs in the US does not always provide an optimistic picture of individuals 'bouncing back' in business.
102 Lawless notes the mythology in the US of the founders of Google who financed their business initially through 'all of our credit cards and our friends' credit cards and our parents credit cards'.
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Bankruptcy law may aspire to facilitate this type of high-risk, high-reward business but Lawless cites Shane's text The Illusions of Entrepreneurship 104 which notes that most small businesses fail; only a few are established in high tech industries; and they contribute only a modest number of jobs. A more forgiving bankruptcy law for self-employed individuals is certainly justifiable for similar reasons to those applicable to consumers, but the evidence is not overwhelming on its promotion of entrepreneurialism.
A
Research on NINA Programmes
Little systematic research exists on the success of schemes designed specifically to provide a swift fresh start for those with few assets or income. In England and Wales, women represent the majority of users of the Debt Relief Order ('DRO'). Many are sole parents and unemployed. They owe debts to central and local state creditors and public utilities, as well as private creditors. 105 Reductions in income and increases in expense dominate the reasons for filing a DRO (Table 3) . A government review in 2014-15 did gather information from approved intermediaries and others on its operation. The consensus was that the 'current system is working well'.
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Clients of intermediaries indicated that the DRO had improved their mental and physical health. The Order also had a positive impact on 50 per cent of debtors' relationships with their families. 107 However, little evidence exists as to the economic and financial impact of the order. Sixty-one percent of debtors in a non-random online survey indicated that they had not wished to access credit after the DRO, with one commenting that the experience of the DRO has 'taught them a lesson about borrowing in the future'.
108 An earlier pilot study of bankruptcy had also found that a significant portion of bankrupts communicated a reluctance to borrow in the future, 109 and Porter identified the same theme in her 2010 US study. 110 The DRO could not only be performing a 'responsibilising' or disciplining function, but also undermining the objective of consumers re-entering the credit market. Further preliminary non-random research on social media suggests that individuals are often concerned about the effect of a DRO on their credit rating, with some regretting the effects it may have on their ability to obtain credit. 111 Evaluation of the similar 'No Asset' procedure in New Zealand concluded that the benefits of the procedure, while significant, might be short term, addressing immediate debt problems but not more general budgeting skills among the debtors interviewed 112 .
These special means-tested procedures may increase access through reduced costs but their relatively stringent access controls suggest a continuing fear among policy makers about moral hazard and opportunism in insolvency. The Insolvency Service also has an interest in minimising its costs in administering NINA insolvencies. It devotes modest resources to the DRO and covers its costs through the user fee, with advice agencies (the approved intermediaries) bearing the majority of the costs of screening individuals. an opportunity to study the intersection of private law regulation of debt, and housing and welfare policy and administration.
B Summary
The following points arise from analysis of the empirical studies in this section. First, bankruptcy does seem to provide benefits for some individuals but not others. This might seem a trite observation but further research to identify relevant groups who may benefit would be useful. Further longitudinal studies are necessary of the trajectory of individuals into overindebtedness, the role of bankruptcy as an intervention in the process, and the subsequent experience of the debtor. Typologies of the debtor career may emerge from such studies. The Money Advice Service in the UK for example has attempted to outline different categories of the over-indebted, including 'struggling students, benefits dependent families, worried working families, stretched families, low wage families and optimistic young workers'. 123 Debt relief might have different consequences for these groups. Debt advice agencies may already explicitly or implicitly tailor advice based on these typologies, but further research on the debt career of these distinct groups and the effects of bankruptcy on the career should be undertaken. Second, the extent of the benefit of the fresh start may depend on the practices of market actors such as banks 124 and credit reference agencies. It is the rules of credit reporting systems, used by creditors, insurance companies, employers and landlords, rather than the law, which may determine the availability of services for individuals who have filed for bankruptcy. 125 The English attempt to use the Bankruptcy Restriction Order signal as a warning for the market by separating culpable from innocent bankrupts seems to have had little effect on credit reporting systems. 126 Third, bankruptcy as presently structured, may be a limited remedy for certain groups who suffer from continuing instability of employment, long term poverty or unemployment. It may represent a temporary relief but may need to be integrated with better social protections.
127 It is not a substitute for such protections. Existing measures to alter bankrupts' behaviour through counselling are unlikely to be effective in addressing the problems faced by this group. 128 The studies pose the research question of how personal insolvency law, a private law form of consumption insurance, fits with social insurance and welfare provision, which may differ between countries. Fourth, Howard, in an analysis of ideas associated with the fresh start, poses the question whether bankruptcy is expected to serve too 122 For example, individuals using a DRO may still be evicted from social housing. See Places for People Homes Ltd v Sharples; A2 Dominion Homes Ltd v Goddfrey [2011] EWCA Civ 813 (holding that a DRO order did not act as a stay on a social landlord evicting a tenant). 123 See Money Advice Service, Indebted Lives: The Complexities of Life in Debt (2014). 124 Which may close a bank account of a bankrupt in England and Wales. 125 See the interesting discussion of the role of these systems in influencing the effectiveness of a fresh start in Howell and Mason, above n 10. The World Bank Report on the Treatment of the Insolvency of Natural Persons, above n 52, noted the potential for these systems to discriminate and the relative absence of research on this topic. 126 Institutional creditors have their own systems for assessing credit so that legal provisions requiring bankrupts to disclose their status if borrowing over £500 are something of a dead letter. 127 Atfield, Lindley and Orton, above n 114, 66, argue on the basis of their research that 'we need to think very differently about debt. Policy debates are stuck in ruts and do not fit with the lived reality of debt as revealed in this research. Wilful non-payment and financial mismanagement are minor concerns. Policy makers should pay much more attention to "upstream" measures that prevent chronic debt problems arising in the first place, such as low wages, social security, health.' 128 A meta-analysis of studies of financial education concluded that financial education may have a role in improving behaviours where individuals have 'the ability or slack to exert greater control'. It could improve savings behaviour but 'did less well in preventing loan defaults': Margaret Miller et al, 'Can You Help Someone Become Financially Capable? A Meta-analysis of the Literature' (Background Paper, World Bank, 2014, on file with author). many masters. 129 We might want to be more modest in our expectations of the fresh start. We should also recognise the challenges in measuring the relationships between the fresh start and achieving a variety of social and economic objectives. Finally, the gap between the promise and the reality of the fresh start as a safety net suggests the value of considering alternative, more radical analyses of personal insolvency law in contemporary capitalism. These might open up new approaches and research questions for personal insolvency law research.
IV THE RADICAL CRITIQUE AND THE STUDY OF PERSONAL INSOLVENCY
The rise in the significance of personal insolvency law is linked with the transformations in capitalism since the 1970s. These have resulted in a rise in inequality, 130 stagnation of wages in several countries, and the growth in household debt. The decline of the 'male breadwinner' model of the household and the rise of the two-income household creates a hostage to fortune should one partner lost a job. Neoliberal policies reduced the power of labour and welfare entitlements and embraced consumerism and entrepreneurialism. This period of high globalisation since the 1980s has been one where the lower middle classes of the rich countries have been the largest losers, 131 and studies suggest that this group is most likely to face issues of over-indebtedness and insolvency.
Theorising about credit and debt increased exponentially after the Great Recession, often as part of analyses of contemporary capitalism and neoliberalism. 132 Several writers have highlighted the role of household debt in maintaining consumer demand in the face of stagnating wages, but also in contributing to unsustainable housing bubbles. 133 Crouch describes this phenomenon as 'privatized Keynesianism', 134 which reconciles labour flexibility with the maintenance of consumer demand. Streeck, adopting crisis theories of capitalism developed by the Frankfurt School in the late 1960s, argues that capitalism faced a legitimation crisis, as capitalist states were increasingly unable to steer the economy effectively and make good on increased social expectations. One strategy to address this problem was the promotion of private consumption, financed by 'lavish credit to private households', thereby 'buying time for the existing social and economic order'. as the factory, a society of control now exists, 137 where the creditor-debtor relationship has become more central to contemporary capitalism than the capital-labor relationship. The power to control and constrain debtors 'does not come from outside, as in disciplinary societies, but from debtors themselves'. 138 This shaping of individual subjectivity may be through government promotion of financial literacy, or technologies of credit scoring, with credit bureaux performing a sorting and disciplining role. 139 Individuals are encouraged to check their credit score and improve their credit rating. They must learn to live with debt. 140 Consumers are enlisted as regulatory subjects to make credit markets competitive (for example, through switching behaviour) and by policing 'internalities' such as impulsiveness or myopia, which might result in over-indebtedness. This is the world of the responsible borrower. 141 The idea of debt as a disciplining force is not new. Calder argued that the rise of instalment debt in the US, which required individuals to adjust to the discipline of monthly payments, extended the discipline of the Fordist factory system to private consumption. 142 He also documents the efforts of elite opinion makers to normalise and legitimise consumer debt, for example changing its description from 'consumptive' to consumer debt in the 1930s. This conscious creation of a debt culture was supported both by labour and business interests in the US. 143 Marxist analyses link both material conditions and ideological factors to paint a picture of exploitative credit, where financial institutions have increasingly turned to value-extraction from consumers as a source of profit, 144 legitimated by liberal credit narratives. Soederberg argues that capital exploits low income workers through the credit system, a form of secondary exploitation which fails to address the continuing problem of falling profits, low productivity and stagnant wages. The law structures and legitimates this exploitation through what she terms the Debtfare State as one component of the neoliberal state. A neo-liberal discourse of the 'democratisation of credit', 'financial inclusion', and 'consumer protection' legitimates this exploitation. The democratisation of credit to poorer individuals substitutes for secure jobs; 'financial inclusion' masks the often poor credit terms which many workers obtain; and consumer protection relies on 'individualized market based protection rather than the welfare 137
